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Abstract 
This paper investigates how the gains from commitment are large when inflation persistence and data uncertainty 
coexist. We consider two types of data uncertainty: measurement errors of potential output and inflation. We show 
that under a situation where data uncertainty exists, there are large gains from commitment as long as inflation is not 
extremely forward-looking or backward-looking. In particular, an increase in measurement error of inflation reduces 
the gains from commitment when forward-looking inflation is important, whereas there are large gains from 
commitment as long as inflation is not extremely backward-looking.
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     1 Introduction
The central bank faces data uncertainty associated with a situation where the central
bank has diﬃculty in forecasting the natural rate of output and the natural inter-
est rate since these variables contain measurement errors. Aoki (2003) shows that
in the forward-looking sticky price model, the central bank implements its monetary
policy more cautiously when data uncertainty is present. In addition, several studies
ﬁnd that inﬂation dynamics depends on both past and future inﬂation. A commit-
ment policy generally leads to preferable outcomes to a discretionary policy in a pure
forward-looking sticky price model. This is because the central bank, which conducts
a commitment policy, can create policy inertia into the economy by manipulating the
expectations of the private sector. The gains from commitment might decrease, how-
ever, when inﬂation persistence is present. How should the central bank conduct its
monetary policy when inﬂation persistence and data uncertainty coexist?
This paper examines optimal monetary policy when inﬂation persistence and data
uncertainty coexist. It is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) that plays an
important role in the New Keynesian model. Empirical studies show that the standard
NKPC is a forward-looking structure, whereas inﬂation persistence is an important
element in economic dynamics. Inﬂation persistence also plays an important role in
theoretical analysis. As noted above, in a purely forward-looking model, a commitment
policy leads to preferable outcomes to a discretionary policy. On the contrary, Amato
and Laubach (2003) investigate optimal monetary policy with inﬂation persistence, and
show that the welfare loss is larger as inﬂation is highly persistent. Steinsson (2003)
shows that there are gains from commitment as long as inﬂation is not predominately
backward-looking.
Svensson and Woodford (2003) attempt to explore optimal monetary policy with
measurement errors, and show that under symmetric information between the central
bank and private sector, the central bank can separate the estimation of unobservable
variables from the derivation of optimal monetary policy. This is referred to as the
separation theorem. They ﬁnd that commitment is diﬀerent from discretion in that
under a commitment policy, the model estimation and prediction depend on the past
Lagrange multiplier associated with forward-looking variables. Svensson and Woodford
(2003) point out that in such a case, there are gains from employing a commitment
policy.
Our purpose is to investigate whether it is important to consider a situation where
inﬂation persistence and data uncertainty coexist in monetary policy analysis. As
far as we know, there are no studies that investigate optimal monetary policy that
includes both inﬂation persistence and data uncertainty. We guess that even if inﬂation
persistence and data uncertainty coexist, there are additional gains from commitment.
We show that under a situation where data uncertainty exists, there are large gains
from commitment as long as inﬂation is not extremely forward-looking or backward-
looking. In particular, an increase in measurement error of inﬂation reduces the gains
1from commitment when forward-looking inﬂation is important, whereas there are large
gains from commitment as long as inﬂation is not extremely backward-looking.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model used in this paper. Section 3 describes the calibration, and Section 4 reports
simulation results. Section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Model
Our model is based on the framework of Amato and Laubach (2003). We use lower case
variables to denote a log deviation from the steady state. Speciﬁcally, a log-linearized
variable around the steady state is expressed by ht = log(Ht/ ¯ H).
The expectational IS curve, which is derived from the representative household’s
Euler equation for optimal consumption, is given by
xt = Etxt+1 − σ (rt − Etπt+1) + et, (1)
where the output gap is deﬁned by xt = yt−¯ yt, yt represents the log-deviation of actual
output, and ¯ yt is the log-deviation of potential output. Also, rt represents the nominal
interest rate, πt is the rate of inﬂation and et represents the natural rate of interest
that holds under the eﬃcient level of output. Finally, σ is the positive parameter. We




t = ¯ yt + ε¯ yt, (2)
π
o
t = πt + επt, (3)
where ¯ yo
t and πo
t are measurable variables and the measurement errors ε¯ yt and επt are
i.i.d.
Inﬂation adjustment is described by the NKPC. Following Amato and Laubach
(2003), we employ the rule-of-thumb hypothesis. A fraction 1 − α of all ﬁrms adjusts
their price while the remaining fraction of ﬁrms α do not. Moreover, amongst ﬁrms
that can adjust price, a fraction ω sets price optimally, while a fraction 1−ω sets price












t is the price for ﬁrms that use the rule-of-thumb pricing rule, and P ∗
t is the
optimal price index in period t − 1. Under these conditions, we obtain the following
hybrid NKPC:




α + (1 − ω)(1 − α(1 − β))
,γb ≡
1 − ω
α + (1 − ω)(1 − α(1 − β))
,
δ ≡
ω(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α + (1 − ω)(1 − α(1 − β))
ψ + σ−1
1 + ψ¯ θ
.
Also ut is a cost-push shock associated with time-varying mark-up. β, ψ, and ¯ θ are
positive parameters. The parameter ω plays an important role in the NKPC. The
smaller the value of ω is, the more backward-looking the NKPC is. Moreover, it follows
that the smaller ω is, the ﬂatter the slope of the NKPC is.
Next, we consider the central bank’s objective function with a micro-foundation
when inﬂation is persistent. As shown in Amato and Laubach (2003), under the case




















Ω = uc¯ Y
α
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
(1 + ψ¯ θ)¯ θ,λx =
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
ψ + σ−1





where ∆πt denotes change in inﬂation. A stabilization term for change in inﬂation
emerges when inﬂation persistent is present. This indicates that the more persistent
inﬂation is (small ω), the larger the value of the stabilization term of change in inﬂation,
λ∆π is. Inversely, the more forward-looking the NKPC is (large ω), the smaller the value
of λ∆π is.
3 Calibration
In this section, we describe the parameters used in this paper.1 With the exception
of stadard deviations and coeﬃcients for serial correlation, the parameters used in this
paper are based on Chapter 5 in Woodford (2003). We set the degree of price rigidity α
to 0.66, the discount factor β to 0.99, and the price elasticity of demand for individual
goods θ to 7.88. Next, we set the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient for consumption
σ to 6.0 and the elasticity of labor supply ψ to 0.47. Following Ehrmann and Smets
(2003), we set standard deviations σu, σ¯ y, and σe to 0.13, 0.63, and 0.42, respectively.
Also, the standard deviation of the mesurement error of potential output is set to 0.06.
Finally, we assume that the coeﬃcients for serial correlation, ρ¯ y and ρe, are 0.95 and
0.5, respectively.
1We examine whether the changes in several parameters aﬀect the gains from commitment, and
check that the results were unaﬀected. We also ﬁnd that an increase in the standard error of mea-
surement error for inﬂation reduces the gain from commitment, but the results of the paper are still
robust to the change in measurement error of inﬂation.
3Figure 1: The gains from commitment when inﬂation persistence and measurement











































As our model includes data uncertainty, we cannot derive optimal monetary policy
by solving the standard linear rational expectation model. Gerali and Lippi (2008)
construct the solution methods for Linear-Quadratic problems with data uncertainty.
Therefore, we derive optimal policy under both discretion and commitment by using
Gerali and Lippi’s (2008) methods.
Figure 1 shows the gains from commitment when inﬂation persistence and measure-
ment error of potential output change. It follows from Figure 1 that there are large gains
from commitment as long as inﬂation is not extremely forward-looking or backward-
looking. In particular, the gains attain the maximum value when ω takes 0.5. We also
ﬁnd that the degree of uncertainty about potential output does not change the gains
from commitment. This indicates that the degree of measurement error of potential
output is independent of that of inﬂation persistence.
Figure 2 illustrates how the gains from commitment change when inﬂation persis-
tence and measurement error of inﬂation increase. We ﬁnd that an increase in uncer-
4Figure 2: The gains from commitment when inﬂation persistence and measurement







































tainty about inﬂation reduces the gains from commitment when inﬂation is forward-
looking. The interpretation of this result is as follows. In a forward-looking model,
the central bank can introduce policy inertia, and therefore induce negative impacts on
inﬂation. As a result, compared to monetary policy under discretion, commitment pol-
icy can reduce welfare losses through the expectations of the private sector. However,
the central bank produces less policy inertia in the forward-looking model with large
measurement error of inﬂation than in that without data uncertainty. In other words,
the central bank conducts its monetary policy more cautiously as measurement error of
inﬂation becomes larger. This means that the measurement error of inﬂation weakens
the eﬀectiveness of the commitment policy. Consequently, the gains from commitment
are smaller as uncertainty about measurement error of inﬂation becomes larger.
Figure 2 shows, however, that the gains from commitment are large as long as
inﬂation is not predominately backward-looking. As shown in Steinsson (2003), the
gains from commitment decrease as inﬂation becomes persistent. On the other hand, the
welfare losses generated from measurement error of inﬂation also decrease as inﬂation
becomes persistent. This implies that there are large gains from commitment as long
5as the latter eﬀect dominates the former eﬀect. Indeed, the gains from commitment is
large when inﬂation is not predominately forward-looking or backward-looking. Thus,
Figure 2 reveals that the gains from commitment are large when ω takes the values
from 0.2 to 0.5. Several empirical studies report that the coeﬃcient for lagged inﬂation
ranges from 0.2 to 0.6. For instance, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
for lagged inﬂation is roughly 0.2. Recently, according to Lind´ e (2005) and Kurmann
(2007), the coeﬃcient for backward-looking inﬂation becomes 0.5. The range supported
by several empirical research corresponds to that where ω takes the values from 0.2 to
0.5. We conclude, therefore, that when the central bank conducts its monetary policy,
it should at least take into account a situation where inﬂation persistence and data
uncertainty coexist.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines how the gains from commitment are large when endogenous in-
ﬂation persistence and data uncertainty coexist. We consider two types of data un-
certainty: measurement errors of potential output and inﬂation. We ﬁnd that under a
situation where unobservable variables contain noisy information, there are large gains
from commitment as long as inﬂation is not extremely forward-looking or backward-
looking. From empirical and practical aspects of monetary policy, the assumption that
inﬂation persistence and data uncertainty coexist might be plausible. Therefore, this
paper contributes to the conduct of monetary policy under a situation where the central
bank faces both inﬂation persistence and data uncertainty.
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